Abstract. We present efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and signature schemes under the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption in bilinear groups. In both the IBE and the signature schemes, all parameters have constant numbers of group elements, and are shorter than those of previous constructions based on Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumption. Our constructions use both dual system encryption (Waters, Crypto '09) and dual pairing vector spaces (Okamoto and Takashima, Pairing '08, Asiacrypt '09). Specifically, we show how to adapt the recent DLIN-based instantiations of Lewko (Eurocrypt '12) to the SXDH assumption. To our knowledge, this is the first work to instantiate either dual system encryption or dual pairing vector spaces under the SXDH assumption.
Introduction
Identity-Based Encryption. The idea of using a user's identity as her public encryption key, and thus eliminating the need for a public key certificate, was conceived by Shamir [33] . Such a primitive is known as Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), which has been extensively studied particularly over the last decade. We now have constructions of IBE schemes from a large class of assumptions, namely pairings, quadratic residuosity and lattices, starting with the early constructions in the random oracle model [9, 16, 22] , to more recent constructions in the standard model [14, 7, 8, 15, 2] .
Short IBE. It is desirable that an IBE scheme be as efficient as possible, if it were to have any impact on practical applications. Ideally, we would like to have constant-size public parameters, secret keys, and ciphertexts. Moreover, the scheme should ideally achieve full security, namely to be resilient even against an adversary that adaptively selects an identity to attack based on previous secret keys. The first fully secure efficient IBE with constant-size public parameters and ciphertexts under standard assumptions was obtained by Waters [36] in 2009; this scheme relied on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumptions. Since then, Lewko and Waters [26] and Lewko [25] gave additional fully secure efficient IBE schemes that achieve incomparable guarantees. Prior to these works, all known IBEs (in the standard model) were either selectively secure [14, 7, 15, 2] , or require long parameters [8, 35, 15, 2] , or were based on less standard assumptions that depended on the query complexity of the adversary [21] . From a practical stand-point, Waters' fully secure IBE [36] is still not very efficient as it has relatively large ciphertexts and secret keys, i.e., eleven and nine group elements, 1 respectively. Lewko's scheme [25] improved on both of these parameters at the cost of larger public parameters and master key.
Shorter IBE? In his work, Waters also suggested obtaining even more efficient IBE schemes by turning to asymmetric bilinear groups:
Using the SXDH assumption we might hope to shave off three group elements from both ciphertexts and private keys.
In fact, improving the efficiency of a scheme using asymmetric pairings was first observed by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [10] . At a fixed security level, group elements in the asymmetric setting are smaller and pairings can be computed more efficiently [19] . (Estimated bit sizes of group elements for bilinear group generators are given in Appendix A.) Informally, the SXDH assumption states that there are prime-order groups (G 1 , G 2 , G T ) that admits a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T such that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in both G 1 and G 2 . The SXDH assumption was formally defined by Ballard et al. [4] in their construction of a searchable encryption scheme, and has since been used in a number of different contexts, including secret-handshake schemes [3] , anonymous IBE [17] , continual leakage-resilience [12] , and most notably, Groth-Sahai proofs [24] . Evidence for the validity of this assumption were presented in the works of Verheul [34] and Galbraith and Rotger [20] .
Our Contributions
In this work, we present a more efficient IBE scheme under the SXDH assumption; our scheme also achieves anonymity. 2 The ciphertexts and secret keys consist of only five and four group elements, respectively. That is, we shave off two group elements from both ciphertexts and private keys in Lewko's DLIN-based IBE [25] . See Table 1 for a summary of comparisons between existing and our IBE schemes, where λ is the security parameter. Applying Naor's transform [9, 11] to our scheme, we also obtain an efficient signature scheme. Our approach. As with all known fully secure efficient IBEs, our construction relies on Waters' dual system encryption framework [36] . Following Lewko's DLIN-based IBE [25] , we instantiate dual system encryption under the SXDH assumption via dual pairing vector spaces [29, 30] , which is a technique to achieve orthogonality in prime-order groups. This is the first work to instantiate either dual system encryption or dual pairing vector spaces under the SXDH assumption. We proceed to highlight several salient features of our IBE scheme in relation to Lewko's IBE [25] :
-Our scheme has an extremely simple structure, similar to the selectively secure IBE of Boneh and Boyen [7] , as well as the fully secure analogues given by Lewko and Waters [26] and Lewko [25] . -By shifting from the DLIN assumption to the simpler SXDH assumption, we obtain IBE schemes that are syntactically simpler and achieve shorter parameters. Specifically, Lewko's IBE scheme [25] relies on 6 basis vectors to simulate the subgroup structure in the Lewko-Waters IBE scheme [26] , whereas our construction uses only 4 basis vectors. This means that we can use a 4-dimensional vector space instead of a 6-dimensional one. As a result, we save two group elements in both the secret key and the ciphertext, that is, by a factor of 1/3. The savings for the public parameters and master key is even more substantial, because we use only two basis vectors for the main scheme, as opposed to four basis vectors in Lewko's scheme. In both our scheme and in Lewko's, the remaining two basis vectors are used for the semi-functional components in the proof of security. -The final step of the proof of security (after switching to semi-functional secret keys and ciphertexts) is different from that of Lewko's. We rely on an information theoretic argument similar to that in [31] instead of computational arguments.
Finally, we believe that our SXDH instantiations constitute a simpler demonstration of the power of dual pairing vector spaces.
Independent work of Ramanna et al. An independent work of Ramanna, Chatterjee and Sarkar [32] also demonstrated how to obtain more efficient fully secure IBE via asymmetric pairings. Similar to our work, their constructions rely on dual system encryption; however, they do not make use of dual pairing vector spaces. Our constructions achieve shorter ciphertexts and secret keys than their work, while relying on a single assumption (whereas their construction relies on a triplet of assumptions). Moreover, our scheme achieves anonymity; theirs does not. Finally, they obtain their schemes via careful optimizations, whereas our scheme is derived via a more general framework.
Outline. In Section 2, we present the preliminaries, including security definitions for IBE, our security assumptions, and an overview of dual pairing vector spaces. In Section 3, we present the subspace assumptions based on SXDH. Finally, we present our IBE and signature schemes in Sections 4 and 5.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first recall the definitions of security for IBE, and signatures. We then present a few backgrounds related to groups with efficiently computable bilinear maps and define the Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Identity-Based Encryption and Signatures
Identity-Based Encryption. An Identity-Based Encryption [9] scheme consists of four algorithms: (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec):
-Setup(λ) → PP, MK The setup algorithm takes in the security parameter λ, and outputs the public parameters PP, and the master key M K. -KeyGen(PP, MK, ID) → SK ID The key generation algorithm takes in the master key MK, and an identity ID, and produces a secret key SK ID for that identity. -Enc(PP, ID, M ) → CT ID The encryption algorithm takes in an identity ID, and a message M , and outputs a ciphertext CT ID encrypted under that identity. -Dec(PP, SK ID , CT ID ) → M The decryption algorithm takes in a secret key SK ID , and a ciphertext CT ID , and outputs the message M when the CT ID is encrypted under the same ID.
Anonymous IBE. The security notion of anonymous IBE was formalized by [1] , which is defined by the following game, played by a challenger B and an adversary A.
-Setup The challenger B runs the setup algorithm to generate PP and MK. It gives PP to the adversary A. -Phase 1 The challenger A adaptively requests keys for identities ID, and is provided with corresponding secret keys SK ID , which the challenger B generates by running the key generation algorithm. -Challenge The adversary A gives the challenger B two challenge pairs (M 0 , ID * 0 ) and (M 1 , ID * 1 ). The challenge identities must not have been queried in Phase 1. The challenger sets β ∈ {0, 1} randomly, and encrypts M β under ID * β by running the encryption algorithm. It sends the ciphertext to the adversary A.
-Phase 2 This is the same as Phase 1, with the added restriction a secret key for ID * 0 , ID * 1 cannot be requested.
-Guess The adversary A must output a guess β for β.
The advantage Adv
Definition 1. An Identity-Based Encryption scheme is secure and anonymous if all PPT adversaries achieve at most a negligible advantage in the above security game.
Remark: The security notion of non-anonymous IBE is defined as above with restriction that
Signatures. A signature scheme is made up of three algorithms, (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) for generating keys, signing, and verifying signatures, respectively.
-KeyGen(1 λ ) → PK, SK The key generation algorithm takes in the security parameter λ, and outputs the public key PK, and the secret key SK.
The signing algorithm takes in the secret key SK, and a message M , and produces a signature σ for that message. -Verify(PK, σ, M ) → CT The verifying algorithm takes in the public key PK, and a signature pair (σ, M ), and outputs valid or invalid.
The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability under a chosen message attack [23] , which is defined using the following game between a challenger B and an adversary A.
-Setup The challenger B runs the setup algorithm to generate PK and SK. It gives PK to the adversary A. -Queries The adversary A adaptively requests for messages M 1 , . . . , M ν ∈ {0, 1} * , and is provided with corresponding signatures σ 1 , . . . , σ ν by running the sign algorithm Sign. -Output Eventually, the adversary A outputs a pair (M, σ).
Sig A (λ) of an adversary A is defined to be the probability that A wins in the above game, namely
Definition 2. A signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack if all PPT adversaries achieve at most a negligible advantage in the above security game.
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A, the probability that A wins in the above game is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
Our constructions are based on dual pairing vector spaces proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [29, 30] . In this paper, we concentrate on the asymmetric version [31] . We only briefly describe how to generate random dual orthonormal bases. See [29, 30, 31] for a full definition of dual pairing vector spaces.
) are a tuple of a prime q, cyclic (multiplicative) groups G 1 , G 2 and G T of order q, g 1 = 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 = 1 ∈ G 2 , and a polynomial-time computable nondegenerate bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T i.e., e(g s 1 , g t 2 ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) st and e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1.
In addition to referring to individual elements of G 1 or G 2 , we will also consider "vectors" of group elements. For v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ Z n q and g β ∈ G β , we write g v β to denote a n-tuple of elements of G β for β = 1, 2: g
. For any a ∈ Z q and v, w ∈ Z n q , we have:
Then we define
Here, the dot product is taken modulo q.
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we will choose two random bases
, subject to the constraint that they are "dual orthonormal", meaning that
where ψ is a random element of Z q . We denote such algorithm as Dual(·).
Then for generators g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have
whenever i = j, where 1 here denotes the identity element in G T .
SXDH Assumptions
Definition 4. [DDH1: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G 1 ] Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
The dual of above assumption is Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 2 (denoted as DDH2), which is identical to Definitions 4 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. We say that:
Definition 5. The Symmetric External Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if DDH problems are intractable in both G 1 and G 2 .
Statistical Indistinguishability Lemma
We require the following lemma from [27] in our security proof.
where #C = (q n − 1)(q n − q n−1 ).
In other words, (ρxA −1 ) and (τ vA t ) are uniformly and independently distributed (i.e., equivalently distributed to (r, w)
Subspace Assumptions via SXDH
In this section, we present Subspace assumptions derived from the SXDH assumption. We will rely on these assumptions later to instantiate our IBE scheme. These are analogues of the DLIN-based Subspace assumptions given in [25, 31] .
Definition 6.
[DS1: Decisional Subspace Assumption in G 1 ] Given a group generator G(·), define the following distribution:
where k, n are fixed positive integers that satisfy 2k ≤ n. We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
For our construction, we only require the assumption for n = 4, k = 2. Furthermore, we do not need to provide µ 2 to the distinguisher. Informally, this means that, given:
, the distributions (V 1 , V 2 ) and (W 1 , W 2 ) are computationally indistinguishable, where:
Lemma 2. If the DDH assumption in G 1 holds, then the Subspace assumption in G 1 stated in Definition 6 also holds. More precisely, for any adversary A against the Subspace assumption in G 1 , there exist probabilistic algorithms B whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that Adv
Proof. We assume there exists a PPT algorithm A breaking the Subspace assumption with nonnegligible advantage Adv
DS1
A (λ) (for some fixed positive integers k, n satisfying n ≥ 2k). We create a PPT algorithm B which breaks the DDH assumption in G 1 with non-negligible advantage Adv
T , where T is either g ab 1 or T is a uniformly random element of G 1 .
B first samples random dual orthonormal bases, denoted by f 1 , . . . , f n and f * 1 , . . . , f * n . From the definition, B chooses vectors f 1 , . . . , f n , f * 1 , . . . , f * n randomly, subject to the constraints that f i · f * j ≡ 0 (mod q) when i = j, and f i · f * i ≡ ψ (mod q) for all i from 1 to n, where ψ is a random element of Z q . Then, B implicitly sets:
B also sets the dual basis as:
We observe that under these definitions, b i ·b * j ≡ 0 (mod q) when i = j, and b i ·b * i ≡ ψ (mod q) for all i from 1 to n. We note that B can produce all of g (these require knowledge of g a 2 ). It is not difficult to check that b 1 , . . . , b n and b * 1 , . . . , b * n are properly distributed. Now B creates U 1 , . . . , U k by choosing random values µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ Z q and setting:
In other words, B has implicitly set µ 1 := µ 1 + aµ 2 and µ 2 := µ 2 . We note that these values are uniformly random, and µ 2 is known to B. B can then form U 2 , . . . , U k as:
B implicitly sets τ 1 := b, τ 2 := c and computes:
, then these are distributed as W 1 , . . . , W k , since
B then gives
to A, along with T 1 , . . . , T k . B can then leverage A's advantage Adv
A (λ) in distinguishing between the distributions (V 1 , . . . , V k ) and (W 1 , . . . , W k ) to achieve an advantage Adv
, hence violating the DDH assumption in G 1 .
The dual of the Subspace assumption in G 1 is Subspace assumption in G 2 (denoted as DS2), which is identical to Definitions 6 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. Similarly, we can prove that the Subspace assumption holds in G 2 if the DDH assumption in G 2 holds.
Identity-Based Encryption
We now present our IBE construction along with our proof of its security under the SXDH assumption.
Construction. We begin with our IBE scheme:
-Setup(1 λ ) This algorithm takes in the security parameter λ and generates a bilinear pairing 
-Dec(PP, SK ID , CT ID ) This algorithm computes the message as
Correctness. Correctness is straight-forward:
Proof of Security. We prove the following theorem by showing a series of lemmas.
Theorem 1. The IBE scheme is fully secure and anonymous under the Symmetric External DiffieHellman assumption. More precisely, for any adversary A against the IBE scheme, there exist probabilistic algorithms B 0 , B 1 , . . . , B ν whose running times are essentially the same as that of A, such that
where ν is the maximum number of A's key queries.
We adopt the dual system encryption methodology by Waters [36] to prove the security of our IBE scheme. We use the concepts of semi-functional ciphertexts and semi-functional keys in our proof and provide algorithms that generate them. We note that these algorithms are only provided for definitional purposes, and are not part of the IBE system. In particular, they do not need to be efficiently computable from the public parameters and the master key. KeyGenSF The algorithm picks random values r, t 3 , t 4 ∈ Z q and forms a semi-functional secret key as SK (SF )
EncryptSF The algorithm picks random values random values s, z 3 , z 4 ∈ Z q and forms a semifunctional ciphertext as
We observe that if one applies the decryption procedure with a semi-functional key and a normal ciphertext, decryption will succeed because d * 3 , d * 4 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in exponent of C 1 , and hence have no effect on decryption. Similarly, decryption of a semi-functional ciphertext by a normal key will also succeed because d 3 , d 4 are orthogonal to all of the vectors in the exponent of the key. When both the ciphertext and key are semi-functional, the result of e(C 1 , SK ID ) will have an additional term, namely e(g 1 , g 2 )
is the same as Game Real except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
-Game κ : for κ from 1 to ν, Game κ is the same as Game 0 except that the first κ keys are semifunctional and the remaining keys are normal. -Game F inal : is the same as Game ν , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random identity in Z q . We denote the challenge ciphertext in Game F inal as CT
We prove following lemmas to show the above games are indistinguishable by following an analogous strategy of [25] . Our main arguments are computational indistinguishability (guaranteed by the Subspace assumptions, which are implied by the SXDH assumption) and statistical indistinguishability. The advantage gap between Game Real and Game 0 is bounded by the advantage of the Subspace assumption in G 1 . Additionally, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the challenge ciphertext remains the same from the adversary's view. For κ from 1 to ν, the advantage gap between Game κ−1 and Game κ is bounded by the advantage of Subspace assumption in G 2 . Similarly, we require a statistical indistinguishability argument to show that the distribution of the the κ-th semi-functional key remains the same from the adversary's view. Finally, we statistically transform Game ν to Game F inal in one step, i.e., we show the joint distributions of
are equivalent for the adversary's view. We let Adv
denote an adversary A's advantage in the real game. 1 , U 1 , U 2 , µ 2 ). along with T 1 , T 2 . We require that B 0 decides whether T 1 , T 2 are distributed as g
. B 0 simulates Game Real or Game 0 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B 0 first chooses a random invertible matrix A ∈ Z 2×2 q (A is invertible with overwhelming probability if it is uniformly picked). We implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D, D * to:
We note that D, D * are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. Moreover, B 0 cannot generate g
2 , but these will not be needed for creating normal keys. B 0 chooses random value α ∈ Z q and computes e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . It then gives A the public parameters PP := {G; e(g 1 , g 2 )
The master key
2 } is known to B 0 , which allows B 0 to respond to all of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm.
A sends B 0 two pairs (M 0 , ID * 0 ) and (M 1 , ID * 1 ). B 0 chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts M β under ID * β as follows:
where B 0 has implicitly set s := τ 1 . It gives the ciphertext CT ID * β to A.
, then this is a properly distributed normal encryption of M β . In this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game Real . If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
instead, then the ciphertext element C 1 has an additional term of
in its exponent. The coefficients here in the basis b 3 , b 4 form the vector τ 2 , ID * β τ 2 . To compute the coefficients in the basis d 3 , d 4 , we multiply the matrix A −1 by the transpose of this vector, obtaining
Since A is random (everything else given to A has been distributed independently of A), these coefficients are uniformly random from Lemma 1. Therefore, in this case, B 0 has properly simulated Game 0 . This allows B 0 to leverage A's advantage between Game Real and Game 0 to achieve an advantage against the Subspace assumption in G 1 , namely Adv
Lemma 4. Suppose that there exists an adversary A where |Adv
Then there exists an algorithm B κ such that Adv Proof. B κ is given D := (G; g
along with T 1 , T 2 . We require that B κ decides whether T 1 , T 2 are distributed as g
. B κ simulates Game κ or Game κ−1 with A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . To compute the public parameters and master secret key, B κ chooses a random matrix A ∈ Z 2×2 q (with all but negligible probability, A is invertible). We then implicitly set dual orthonormal bases D, D * to:
We note that D, D * are properly distributed, and reveal no information about A. B κ chooses random value α ∈ Z q and compute e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . B κ can gives A the public parameters PP := {G; e(g 1 , g 2 )
2 } is known to B κ , which allows B κ to respond to all of A's key queries by calling the normal key generation algorithm. Since B κ also knows g 2 , it can easily produce semi-functional keys. To answer the first κ − 1 key queries that A makes, B κ runs the semi-functional key generation algorithm to produce semi-functional keys and gives these to A. To answer the κ-th key query for ID κ , B κ responds with:
This implicitly sets r := τ 1 . If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
, then this is a properly distributed normal key. If T 1 , T 2 are equal to g
, then this is a semi-functional key, whose exponent vector includes
as its component in the span of b * 3 , b * 4 . To respond to the remaining key queries, B κ simply runs the normal key generation algorithm.
At some point, A sends B κ two pairs (M 0 , ID * 0 ) and (M 1 , ID * 1 ). B κ chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts M β under ID * β as follows:
where B κ has implicitly set s := µ 1 . The "semi-functional part" of the exponent vector here is:
We observe that if ID * β = ID κ (which is not allowed), then vectors 1 and 2 would be orthogonal, resulting in a nominally semi-functional ciphertext and key pair. It gives the ciphertext CT ID * β to A.
We 
. Since the distribution of everything given to A except for the κ-th key and the challenge ciphertext is independent of the random matrix A and ID * β = ID κ , we can conclude that these coefficients are uniformly random (except for 1/q probability) from Lemma 1. Thus, B κ has properly simulated Game κ in this case.
In summary, B κ has properly simulated either Game κ−1 or Game κ for A, depending on the distribution of T 1 , T 2 . It can therefore leverage A's advantage between these games to obtain an advantage − 1/q against the Subspace assumption in G 2 , namely Adv is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random identity in Z q .
For this purpose, we pick A := (ξ i,j ) in Game F inal .
In the adversary's view, both (D, D * ) and (F, F * ) are consistent with the same public key. Therefore, the challenge ciphertext and queried secret keys above can be expressed as keys and ciphertext in two ways, in Game ν over bases (D, D * ) and in Game F inal over bases (F, F * ). Thus, Game ν and Game F inal are statistically indistinguishable.
Lemma 6. For any adversary A, Adv
Game F inal A (λ) = 0.
Proof. The value of β is independent from the adversary's view in Game F inal . Hence, Adv In Game F inal , the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T and under a random identity in Z q , independent of the two messages and the challenge identities provided by A. Thus, our IBE scheme is anonymous.
A Signature Scheme
In this section, we present the signature scheme derived from the preceding IBE scheme via Naor's transform. The security of the signature scheme follows from the full security of our IBE scheme. -Verify(PK, σ, M ) This algorithm verifies a signature σ by testing whether e(g
, σ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ) αd 1 ·d * 1 . 3 If the equality holds the signature is declared valid; otherwise it is declared invalid. G1 G2 GT G1 G2 GT G1 G2 GT  Asymmetric 170 340 1020 256 512 3072 640 2560 15360  Symmetric 176 176 1056 512 512 3072 2560 2560 15360   Table 2 . Estimated bit sizes of elements in bilinear groups.
